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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

INTERMOUNTAIN SPORTS, INC.,
a Utah Corporation,

Case No. 20031029-CA

Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,
Defendants/Appel lees.

APPELLEE'S BRIEF

LIST OF PARTIES
Appellant-Plaintiff is Intermountain Sports, Inc. (Intermountain). Intermountain
was a Utah Corporation, however the corporate status became delinquent January 5,
2004 and the corporate status expired May 6, 2004 for failure to file a renewal.
Appellee-Defendant is the Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT) a
department of the State of Utah created by statute Utah Code Ann. § 72-1-201(2001).
JURISDICTION
This case was transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Utah Supreme Court
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j)(2002); the Supreme Court had jurisdiction
over this case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j)(2002), as an appeal from
final judgment

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A,

Inverse Condemnation Claim
Does Intermountain state a protected property interest under Utah law? The

complaint identifies as the sole basis of Intermountain's inverse condemnation claim the
alleged "blocking and/or taking" of the plaintiffs "easement of access." (Complaint
Tflf 31-37. Addendum exhibit 1, R. 7-9.) Under Utah law, private citizens cannot own
an "easement of access" to public right of ways. Thus, the trial court correctly dismissed
Intermountain's inverse condemnation claim against UDOT. (R. 290, 314 at 35.)
Standard of Review:
The dismissal of the complaint under Utah R. Civ P. 12(c) is a question of law
and is reviewed for correctness. A trial court's dismissal is only proper if the
Complaint lacks legal sufficiency to allow a recovery. Bennett v. Jones Waldo, 2003
UT9,U30,70P.3dl7.
B.

Uniform Operation of Laws Claim
Does Utah law recognize a general cause of action for a constitutional violation?

The complaint fails to state a cause of action, instead it accuses UDOT of "arbitrarily
and capriciously providing other businesses with direct and beneficial access to 4500
South Street and by configuring such access so as to direct traffic flow to those
businesses, south of the Affected Property and north and west of the Affected Property,
while at the same time refusing to offer such accommodations to Plaintiff who paid
substantial taxes

" (Complaintfflf39 and 40. Addendum exhibit 1, R. 9,10.)
2

Thus the trial court correctly dismissed this claim as alleged in the complaint as
inadequate to state a cause of action upon which damages can be awarded. (R. 291,
314 at 35.)
Standard of Review:
The dismissal of the complaint under Utah R. Civ P. 12(c) is a question of law
and is reviewed for correctness. A trial court's dismissal is only proper if the
Complaint lacks legal sufficiency to allow a recovery. Bennett v. Jones Waldo, 2003
UT9, 7 0 P J d l 7 .
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Constitution of Utah
Art I, § 22 [Private Property for public use,] Private Property shall not
be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation.
Art I, § 24 [Uniform operation of laws, J All laws of a general nature
shall have uniform operation.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal of the decision of the trial court to grant UDOTs Motion for
Judgment on the pleadings under Utah R. Civ P. 12(c).
The trial court found as a matter of law that the Complaint failed to state a claim
sufficient under Utah law. ( R. 314 at 35.)
Background of the Case
In 1984 the Wasatch Front Regional Council began the 1-15 corridor study to
determine the transportation needs and to plan to meet the needs of the public using
3

this important transportation link. After many years of public debate, planning studies,
formal environmental impact studies, and budgetary deliberations by state, local, and
federal legislative bodies and decision makers, work on the 1-15 and Salt Lake Light
Rail Systems began in 1997.
The 1-15 highway element of the work alone required the demolition and
construction of over 136 bridges, 13 interchanges and 3 interstate-to-interstate highway
interchanges. Every resident and every traveler, transient or resident, in Salt Lake
County was affected by the construction impacts.
Intermountain operated an RV sales business located at 4225 South 500 West in
Murray, Utah. Its business premises are visible, but not directly accessible from 1-15.
The Intermountain premises are accessible only from 500 West. (Complaint f 8,
addendum exhibit 1, R. 2, and addendum exhibit 2, aerial photo map. R. 314 at 9.) The
1-15 project performed no work on 500 West, did not block or disrupt traffic on 500
West and never blocked access to Intermountain premises. (R. 314 at 10.)
Plaintiff claimed it lost the prospect of anticipated merchandise sales during the
1-15 project and filed suit asserting six causes of action. (Complaint, addendum
exhibit 1, R. L) On UDOT's Motion to Dismiss (R. 62, 112) all six causes of action
were dismissed by the trial court as failing to state a legally sufficient claim under Utah
law. (R. 285) Intermountain now appeals only the dismissal of counts one , Inverse
Condemnation, and two, Uniform Application of the Law.

4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
A complaint must state a claim for relief If it does not, the Court may, on
proper motion under Utah R. Civ P. 12(c), dismiss for "failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted." Intermountain's Complaint fails to assert a legally
adequate claim.
Intermountain's Complaint based its inverse condemnation cause of action on
the assertion that it and its customers hold an "easement of access" over 1-15, its offramps, and 4500 South to get to 500 West and thereby travel to plaintiffs premises to
conduct business. (Complaint ^j 30-37, Addendum exhibit 1, R. 7-9.) Utah law
recognizes no such "easement of access" and therefore the trial court was correct to
dismiss the cause of action.
Intermountain's complaint alleges UDOT violated article I, § 24 of Utah's
Constitution1 by providing "other businesses with direct and beneficial access to 4500
South Street" and "configuring such access so as to direct traffic flow to those
businesses." (Complaint ^ 38-40, Addendum exhibit 1, R. 9, 10.)

In stating its

complaint thus, Intermountain fails to state a legal cause of action. Other than a
taking, Utah does not recognize a stand alone cause of action for a constitutional
violation.
Even if there were such a direct constitutional cause of action, plaintiff has not

1

Art I, § 24 [Uniform operation of laws.] All laws of a general nature shall have
uniform operation.
5

demonstrated that, the required elements of the Spackman test have been met as a
prerequisite to any recovery of damages for a constitutional violation. Spackman v.
Bd. of Educ. of the Box Elder Sch. DisU 2000 UT 87, 16 P.3d 533.
The Complaint does not state a cause of action for a constitutional cause of
action for the denial of the uniform application of laws. Plaintiff now points to the
Transportation Code, Title 72, of the Utah Code, as a basis for a cause of action, (Br.
of App. At 8, 27) however, Title 72 creates no private cause of action and no such
cause of action was pleaded in the complaint.
The State and UDOT takes its responsibilities to private property owners very
seriously. UDOT is responsible to both the legislature and certainly to the courts for
its actions. States Counsel was correctly quoted in Intermountain's brief, to argue to
the trial court, that UDOT knew this project would "break some eggs" but the brief
fails to include that it was also argued that "UDOT has never been shy about buying
those eggs that it is responsible for breaking." The purpose of the vast body of Utah
law is to instruct UDOT on what eggs it must buy. Intermountain now wants this
Court to take a quantum leap into the legislative arena to greatly increase those eggs.
As Justice Holmes observed in the leading case Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 43 S.Ct. 158, (1922):
Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to
property could not be diminished without paying for every such change
in the general law.
Id at 413.
6

Holmes went on to caution that in establishing where the limits fall:
The greatest weight is given to the judgment of the legislature but it is
always open to interested parties to contend that the legislature has gone
beyond its constitutional power.
Id at 413.
The legislature must be able to establish budgets for state projects. UDOT must
be able to reasonably plan the costs of its projects. Predictability of what eggs it must
buy is important In doing so, it must be able to rely of the years of decisions of Utah
courts to calculate and follow the law in determining which eggs it buys and which it
does not. Intermountain, on the other hand, asks this court to greatly expand the
properties UDOT must buy. In doing so, however, Intermountain fails to answer some
important questions regarding this expansion of the law. How close must a business be
to be paid under Plaintiffs theory? Should the State pay such impact awards to
businesses within a quarter mile radius of an interchange? Should the circle be a half
mile, one mile, five miles, ten miles? Should the State give an inconvenience payment
to all citizens in the Wasatch Front? How much? Intermountain is asking two million
dollars. Any such payments may violate the constraints on spending of highway funds
of article XIII, § 5(6) of the Utah Constitution.2 Intermountain's premises have never
had direct access to 4500 South Street (Complaint ^f 8, addendum exhibit, R. 2, and
addendum exhibit 2, aerial photo map, R. 9) and the 1-15 project never interfered with

2

Restricts fuel tax spending to highway purposes including right of way taken or
damaged.
7

the access traveling on 500 West from the Intermountain premises to 4500 South. (R.
9-10.) The body of Utah law is clear - if the state takes or damages a protected
property right for a public purpose, it must pay. Intermountain asks for more. In 1904
the Utah Court, in addressing a railroad construction project stated:
We do not wish to be understood as holding that every inconvenience
that an individual may be subjected to in the possession and enjoyment of
his property because of the construction and operation of a railroad or
other public utility in the vicinity of his premises entitles him to damages
or injunctive relief. The rule is will settled that no recovery can be had
for losses and inconveniences which are suffered in common with the
general public..
Stockdale v. Rio Grande Western Railway. 77 P. 849, (Utah 1904), at 852
ARGUMENT
Inverse Condemnation
To prove a taking under Utah law a plaintiff must establish two elements:
1.

The claimant must demonstrate some protectable interest in
property.

2.

The claimant must then show that the interest has been taken or
damaged by government action.

See Strawberry Electric Serv. Dist. v. Spanish Fork City, 918 P.2d 870, 877, (Utah
1996), and View Condominium v. MSICXX 2004 UT App 1041 35.
Intermountain's inverse condemnation is based, according to its complaint, on
its claim that it and its potential customers hold an "easement of access." Intermountain claims that UDOT blocked or interfered with that "easement of access by
8

closing the 4500 South on and off ramps from 1-15 for demolition and reconstruction.
(Complaintffl[32, 33, and 34, Addendum exhibit 1, R. 7-9.)
No "easement of access" as alleged in Intermountain's complaint is recognized
by Utah law. An easement is a property interest. Individuals do not hold a property
interest in public lands. The easement assumed by Intermountain must be based on a
prescriptive right of easement for access. This can be based either on an easement of
necessity or on a pattern of adverse use. Both are well recognized property rights, but
neither are applicable to these facts. No easement of necessity has been plead or is
proper because Intermountain is not "landlocked" and has full access to its land via
public and private rights of way. Further, no prescriptive easement based on historic
use is appropriate under these facts. It is a widely recognized principle of law that one
cannot take an adverse possessory interest against a governmental entity. Sweeten v.
United States. 684 F.2d 679 (10th Cir. 1982). This principle has been statutorily
incorporated into the Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-13. One cannot obtain an interest in a
public way by adverse possession. This doctrine is also confirmed and applied to
claims of prescriptive easements in Lund v. Wilcox, 97 P. 33 (Utah 1908), and Cassity
v. Castago. 347 P.2d 834 (Utah 1959). In citing Lund, the Cassity court stated:
Proof that the land was owned by the government at any time during the
prescriptive period is usually a sufficient defense to a claim of right by adverse
use. One may not adverse the sovereign.
347 P.2d at 834.

9

Utah has long recognized that a change of traffic patterns is not a compensable
property interest. This principle was opined by the Utah Supreme Court as far back as
1941 in the early days of modern highways. In the case of State Road Commission v.
Rozzelle. 101 Utah 464, 120 P.2d 276 (Utah 1941), Justices Wolfe and McDonough in
separate concurring opinions each stated respectively: "The law does not give
[Defendant] a vested right in the business which travel along a public highway may
have afforded them" and "diminution in value of the realty caused by the loss of the
flow of traffic to or past defendant's place of business is not compensable." Id at 277.
In 1968 the Utah Supreme Court again picked up this theme in the case of
Hampton v. State Road Comm'n, 445 P.2d 708 (Utah 1968), where the court, in
holding that the State has police power to place reasonable restrictions on access points
went on to state:
Nor does the right of ingress or egress to or from one's property include
any right in and to existing public traffic on the highway, or any right to
have such traffic pass by one's abutting property. The reason is that all
traffic on public highways is controlled by the police power of the State,
and what the police power may give an abutting property owner in the
way of traffic on .the highway it may take away, and by any such
diversion of traffic the State and any of its agencies are not liable for any
decrease of property values by reason of such diversion of traffic....
Id. at 771. Emphasis added.
Utah also recognizes an access right referred to as an "easement appurtenant."
In 1974 the Utah Supreme Court issued its leading opinion on appurtenant rights in
Utah State Road Comm'n v. Miya, 526 P.2d 926 (Utah 1974). In holding that

10

the rights of access, light, and air are easements appurtenant to the land
of an abutting owner or a street; that constitute property rights forming
part of the owner's estate. These substantial property rights, although
subject to reasonable regulation, may not be taken away or impaired
without just compensation.
I d at 928, 929.
The Miya court was equally clear in proclaiming the principle that:
A property owner has no property right to a free and unrestricted flow of
traffic past his premises, and any impairment or interference with this
flow does not entitle the owner to compensation.
Id at 928.
As recently as November 2002 the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the principle
that the protected appurtenant access right does not create an unlimited claim to access
and traffic movements in Utah Department of Transportation v. Harvey Real Estate,
2002 Ut 107 atf 14, 57 P,3d. 1088 :
This right doesn't include the right to travel in any particular direction
from one's property or upon any particular part of the public highway
right of way. Nor does the right of ingress or egress to or from one's
property include any right in and to existing public traffic on the
highway, or any right to have such traffic pass by one's abutting
property. Quotations omitted.
UDOT v. Harvev 2002 UT 107, % 15, 57 P.3d. 1088.
Intermountain does not enjoy an easement appurtenant because its access point
is not to either 1-15 or to 4500 South. Intermountain's easement appurtenant is to 500
West. (Complaint ^J 8, addendum exhibit 1, R. 2, and addendum exhibit 2, aerial photo
map. R. 314 at 9.)
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It is clear from Utah law that Intermountain and its potential customers did not
have an "easement of access" either by necessity, prescription, or rights appurtenant,
and because its inverse condemnation claim is based on an "easement of access," the
trial court was correct in dismissing the inverse condemnation cause of action.
The brief filed herein by Intermountain's counsel instead of defending its
pleaded cause of action, presents a dissertation on the history of inverse condemnation
law in Utah, and raises many new arguments and academic theories regarding inverse
condemnation which were not advanced in the complaint. Intermountain's counsel
blurs the lines between an inverse taking and a regulatory taking. Appellant's brief
now argues that its protected right is a right to conduct business and enter into
contracts. UDOT's brief will not address the historical discourse but does wish to
address the current state of the law in Utah in inverse condemnation and government
takings both possessory and regulatory.
This Court in View Condominium v. MSICCX 2004 UT App 104, has
reaffirmed the principles stated in Strawberry Electric Serv. Dist. v. Spanish Fork City,
918 P.2d 870, (Utah 1996), that the claimant must demonstrate some recognized
constitutionally protected property interest.
Does Intermountain present a interest in property for the courts to protect with
constitutional fervor? No. The property interest now asserted by Intermountain is the
bare hope that drivers driving southbound on 1-15 will see their show yard located on
the west side of 1-15, and on a sudden impulse will exit 1-15 at 4500 South and drive
12

approximately 1 mile in a circular route to purchase a new motor home or travel trailer.
This wishful thinking of future sales falls far short of the types of contractual property
rights which the Court has described as protected in Strawberry Electric and in
Bagford v. Ephriam City. 904 P.2d 1095, (Utah 1995). Bagford stated that "to create a
protectable property interest, a contact must establish rights more substantial in nature
than a mere unilateral expectation of continued rights or benefits." Id. at 1099.
Referring to contracts as a property right the court stated:
A contact that is terminable at the will of either party does not by itself
give rise to protectable property interest because the mere expectation of
benefits under such a contract does not give the promisor a legally
enforceable right against a promisee to provide future service and
therefore does not by itself provide a basis for compensation for loss of
future business.
Id at 1099.
Intermountain does not present an enforceable contract right, merely the hope of
future sales. A protected property right must demonstrate a more certain legal right
than wishful business hopes of potential sales.
Even if Intermountain were able to present a protected property right, the
second element of this test must still be established - was the interest taken or damaged
by government action? Intermountain was open for business throughout the project
time period using its normal and only access to its premises off of 500 West. Traffic
on 500 West was not halted, blocked, or otherwise interfered with by the project.
(Complaint, addendum exhibit 1, R. 1, R. 314 at 9, 27.) The construction of the 1-15
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project did not constitute a taking of Intermountain's protected property rights under
Utah law.
Intermountain now, in the alternative, also attempts to recharacterize the
property interest taken by UDOT as Intermountain's "right to use its land for the
operation of a commercial business." (Brief pp. 8, 11-15.) This argument was not
presented by Intermountain in its complaint and thus is not properly before the court.
In any event, this Court has addressed a similar argument in its recent decision in
Diamond B-Y Ranches v. Tooele County, 2004 UT App. 135. In B-Y Ranches, this
Court opined that a taking occurs if:
[a] regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive use of
land, or even if the property has not necessarily been deprived of all
economically beneficial use; an analysis of several factors indicates that
the interference is so great that a virtual taking has nonetheless occurred.
Quotations omitted.
Id at 114.
The B-Y Ranches court reversed the trial court's dismissal of the claim and
remanded the case for a factual finding to determine "if the effect of denying the
permit is to leave its property economically idle... ."Id. atf 18.
Although the complaint does not present these arguments and Intermountain
raises them first in its brief, the allegation must fail on its face because unlike the
situation in B-Y Ranches, as the Complaint indicates, the land was not left idle but was
used for commercial business operations throughout the 1-15 project and is still so used
to date. (R. 314 at 27).
14

Finally, Intermountain argues that a jury should be allowed to determine what is
a compensable claim for a taking under Utah law. (Br. Of App. at 8, 11.) Juries
determine questions of fact. Utah Code Ann §78-21-2 (2002). These are questions of
law to be determined by the court. Utah Code Ann § 78-21-3(2002).
Uniform Operation of Laws
The complaint identifies as the basis of Intermountain's denial of uniform
operation of laws claim the alleged "arbitrarily and capriciously providing other
businesses with direct and beneficial access to 4500 South Street and by configuring
such access so as to direct traffic flow to those businesses, south of the Affected
Property and north and west of the Affected Property, while at the same time refusing
to offer such accommodations to Plaintiff who paid substantial taxes. . . ." (Complaint
t f 39 and 40. Addendum exhibit 1, R. 9,10.)
First, art 1, § 24 is not a self enforcing clause of the Utah Constitution under
Spackman. Second, these allegations fail to state a cause of action upon which
damages can be awarded. A claim for violation of a state constitutional right requires
either a statutory or common law cause of action such as a negligence claim. In
probing the sufficiency of a claim for damages resulting from an alleged constitutional
violation, the Utah Supreme Court has held:
We begin by identifying the source of our authority to award damages for
constitutional violations. Except for the Takings Clause, the Utah
Constitution does not expressly provide damage remedies for
constitutional violations. Thus, aside from the Takings Clause, there is
no textual constitutional right to damages for one who suffers a
15

constitutional tort.... In the absence of applicable constitutional or
statutory authority, Utah courts employ the common l a w . . . . Hence, a
Utah court's ability to award damages for violation of a self-executing
constitutional provision rests on the common law.
Spackman v. Bd. of Educ. of the Box Elder Sch. DisU 2000 UT 87, % 20, 16 P.3d 533
(2000).
Intermountain's complaint fails to state a legal basis for its cause of action and
was properly dismissed by the trial court on the Utah R. Civ P. 12(c) motion to dismiss.
Intermountain now argues to this Court that the Transportation Code, Title 72 of
the Utah Code, gives Intermountain a cause of action. (Brief pp. 9, 27.) Intermountain
is unable to point to an express creation of a private cause of action in Title 72 because
none exists. Under Utah law, it is improper to read a private cause of action into a
statute if it is not expressly stated.
In the absence of language expressly granting a private right of action in
the statute itself, the courts of this state are reluctant to imply a private
right of action based on state law.
Miller v. Weaver. 2003 UT 12, 66 P.3d 592 (2003) ^ 20.
Intermountain's complaint was properly dismissed because it fails to properly
allege a cause of action upon which damages can be awarded under Utah law.
Even had the complaint properly stated a compensable cause of action under
Utah law, it fails to allege the three required elements to proceed with a private suit for
damages under a constitutional provision as announced by the Utah Supreme Court in
Spackman v. Board of Ed. of Box Elder. 2000 UT 87, 6 P.3d 533 (2000).
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The Spackman court announced:
to ensure that damage actions [for constitutional violations] are permitted
only under appropriate circumstances, we therefore hold that a plaintiff
must establish the following three elements before he or she may proceed
with a private suit for damages.
First, plaintiff must establish that he or she suffered a "flagrant"
violation of his or her constitutional rights. . . .
Second, a plaintiff must establish that existing remedies do not
redress his or her injuries....
Third, a plaintiff must establish that equitable relief, such as an
injunction, was and is wholly in adequate to protect the plaintiffs rights
or redress his or her injuries.... Id. at ^J 20.
Intermountain's complaint fails to allege how these three required elements
have been established. The complaint was therefore properly dismissed.
Intermountain leaps over these steps and even in its brief still fails to establish a basis
for a court entertaining its claim.
Intermountain's complaint fails to state a recognized cause of action for a
violation of art. I § 24 of the Utah constitution and the additional arguments now
presented in its brief also fall far short of justifying allowing the case to proceed.
CONCLUSION
A claim for a government taking whether a regulatory taking or an inverse
condemnation, must assert a protected property right under Utah law. Intermountain
fails to do so under Coleman v Utah State Land Board, 795 P.2d 622 (Utah 1990),
under Rocky Mountain Thrift Stores v. Salt Lake City. 784 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989),
under Strawberry. 918 P.2d 870, (Utah 1996), under Bagford, 904 P.2d 1095, (Utah
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1995), or under Diamond B-Y Ranches, 2004 UT App. 135. Intermountain is asking
this Court to create new law by creating a new cause of action.
Intermountain fails to state a proper cause of action for a violation of the
uniform application of laws constitutional provision. The trial Court was correct to
grant the Utah R. Civ P. 12(c) Motion to dismiss because the complaint was deficient.
The decision of the trial court should be affirmed.
DEFENDANT STATE OF UTAH DOES NOT REQUEST
ORAL ARGUMENT OR A PUBLISHED OPINION
Defendant-Appellee State of Utah does not request oral argument and a
published opinion in this matter. The questions raised in this appeal, having already
been decided by the courts in published opinions, are not such that oral argument or a
published opinion are necessary. If argument is held by the Court, the defendant
desires to participate.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

of June, 2004.

Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Defendant State of Utah,
Utah Department of Transportation
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
This is to certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF
DEFEND ANT-APPELLEE STATE OF UTAH, UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION to the following this _ ^ ^ j 3 a y of June, 2004:
John Martinez
2974 East St. Mary's Circle
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108

B. Ray Zoll
ZOLL & TYCKSEN, L.C.
5300 South 3600 West, Suite 360
Murray, Utah 84123
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ADDENDA
Exhibit 1. Plaintiff s complaint
Exhibit 2. Aerial Photo map
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EXHIBIT 1

RECEIVED
JUN " 6 2002

3A

"0Y%TC0Uf,T

UT. DEPT. OF TRANSP.
Steven C. Tycksen (#3Wffi»^MQMT. UNIT
B. Ray Zoll ( # 3 6 0 7 )
ZOLL & TYCKSEN, L C .
5300 South 360 West, Suite 360
Murray, Utah 84123
Telephone: (801) 685-7800
Facsimile: (801) 685-7808
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Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH, SANDY DEPARTMENT

Intermountain Sports, Inc.
COMPLAINT
(JURY DEMAND)

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No.

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION AND
MURRAY CITY,

H o n o r a b l e / ^ ! na

\\IAG,

Defendants.

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Intermountain Sports, Inc.
("Intermountain"), by and through its attorneys, Zoll & Tycksen, and
complains against the Defendants as follows:
J U R I S D I C T I O N , VENUE AND PARTIES
1.

This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this lawsuit
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4(1).

Venue of this claim is properly in this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-13-1, in that the cause of action arose in Salt
.Lake County, and the property at issue is located in Salt Lake
County.
Plaintiff Intermountain is a business operating in Murray, Utah as
a recreational vehicle sales company.
Defendant Murray City (the "City") is a municipal corporation
organized pursuant to the laws of the State of Utah.
Defendant Utah Department of Transportation ("UDOT") is an
agency or instrumentality of the State of Utah.
Intermountain has a right to sue the defendants pursuant to
Article I, Sections 22 and 24 of the Utah Constitution, Utah Code
Ann. §§ 63-30-10.5 and 63-30-10, and other legal and equitable
remedies.
The claims alleged in this complaint arise in Salt Lake County,
State of Utah.
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
John Ashby ("Ashby") is the owner and operator of
Intermountain located at 4225 South 500 West, Murray, Utah,
2

on the west frontage road at 1-15 and north of 4500 South
Street ("the Affected Property").
9.

Intermountain has had a longstanding easement of access on the
Affected Property, giving it access to the 1-15 southbound offramp to 4500 South and to 4500 South Street. The Affected
Property is shown on the map attached hereto as Exhibit A and
incorporated herein by this reference.

10.

On July 14, 1997, Intermountain received a letter and flyer from
Carol Provenzano with Wasatch Constructors giving open house
meeting information and the beginning date, on or about August
6, 1997, of the 1-15 Reconstruction Project. See Letter attached
as Exhibit B.

11.

Upon information and belief, the open house meetings served
only for information and instruction, not for hearing and meeting
the needs of local businesses.

12.

Prior to construction, Ashby performed extensive due diligence to
determine whether or not there would be little effect to his
business from the Reconstruction Project.

13.

While serving as President of the 1-15 Coalition, a non-profit
3

group of business owners representing over 850 businesses
along the freeway corridor, Ashby testified at a meeting
.addressing the Reconstruction Project at the request of Senator
Howell.
14.

Ashby, acting for Intermountain Sports RV and the 1-15
Coalition, contacted UDOT with respect to their plan for the 4500
South interchange. In response to his query, he was provided a
copy of a letter and drawing. These-show a full closure of the
Affected Property at the 4500 South interchange for a period of
one year at the most.

15.

UDOT represented to Intermountain that the Affected Property
would be closed for one year.

16.

UDOT officials met with business owners, including Ashby, and
represented to said business owners that their concerns would
be taken into consideration, but no action was taken nor
remuneration made for the anticipated taking of Intermountain's
property rights.

17.

In direct reliance on the statements, representations and
drawings of the City and UDOT, Intermountain did not pursue
4

action against UDOT or the City and has only now been able to
determine its ascertainable damages, making its claims ripe for
adjudication.
18.

After reconstruction of 1-15 began, traffic flow on 1-15, in the
area of 4500 South Street, dropped two thirds from the traffic
flow figures prior to the Reconstruction Project.

19.

In July 1997, UDOT began reconstruction on 1-15 effecting 4500
South Street, by closing the off-rarrvp to the Affected Property.
See Exhibit A.

20.

Access to the Affected Property was closed until December 1998,
a period of 18 months instead of the 12 months promised by
UDOT in its construction contract.

21.

The City and UDOT placed periodic closures on traffic at the 4500
South Street off-ramp over the following 2 Vi years.

22.

The State and City were effectively closing access to freeway
exits and entrances, as well as access for East and West traffic at
the 4500 South Street off-ramp, from July 1997 until May 2001,
nearly a period of four years.

23.

The access provided by Defendants, in lieu of direct access off
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the 4500 South off-ramp, involved a circuitous 2.5-mile loop (the
"Circuitous Loop") (Attached as Exhibit "C") behind the Affected
Property, which frustrated and eliminated potential customers.
The Circuitous Loop was impractical and unreasonable for
purposes of bringing prospective customers from the freeway to
Plaintiff's business. Not only was the critical line of sight lost,
but also the route was lengthy and confusing.
24.

Upon information and belief, the already significantly diminished
number of potential customers from drive-by traffic, now 1/3 of
what it was prior to re-construction, ended up getting lost and
never arriving to Intermountain.

25.

The closure of the off-ramp, coupled with the change in
configuration, denied reasonable access to the Affected Property
and substantially damaged the value of Plaintiff's property in an
amount to be proven at trial but currently calculated to be in
excess of $2,000,000.00.

26.

The City constructed the Circuitous Loop in such a manner that
other businesses obtained direct access to 4500 South off-ramp
traffic, who otherwise benefited from the loss to Intermountain.

6

27.

Such action by the Defendants became tantamount to a taking of
the property for the good of others and at the expense of
Intermountain without just compensation.

28.

In the alternative, the City and/or UDOT, their agents, and
employees who planned directed the traffic flow surrounding the
Affected Property failed to exercise reasonable care, which
directly resulted in the loss of business incurred by
Intermountain.

29.

Further, UDOT, its employees, and agents failed to exercise
reasonable care in the planning and execution of the
reconstruction of 1-15 and the 4500 South Street interchange,
which directly resulted in the loss of business incurred by
Intermountain.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(INVERSE CONDEMNATION - UDOT & MURRAY CITY)
30.

Plaintiff re-alleges each of the allegations contained in
paragraphs 1 through 29 of the Complaint as if fully set forth
herein.
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31.

In violation of § 63-30-10.5 of the Utah Code and Article I
Section 22 of the Utah Constitution, Defendants took or impaired
Plaintiff's substantial property right for a public use without just
compensation.

32.

Upon information and belief, Defendants' determination to block
and/or take the Plaintiff's easement of access over the Affected
Property, allowing access to the 1-15 Southbound off-ramp at
4500 South and to 4500 South Street was based on a public
purpose to expand 1-15 to reduce traffic impediments and safety
concerns along 1-15, as well as enhancing the 4500 South offramp.

33.

In closing the off-ramp and otherwise blocking and/or taking the
Plaintiff's easement of access, Defendants substantially and
materially impaired Plaintiff's right of access to the 1-15 off-ramp
at 4500 South and to 4500 South Street as well as Plaintiff's
customers' right of access to 4500 South Street and the Affected
Property.
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34.

In blocking and/or taking the Plaintiff's easement of access over
the Affected Property, Defendants substantially diminished the
value of Plaintiff's private property.

35.

This injury to Intermountain was an unavoidable result of the
City and UDOT's action and was continuous for a period of
almost four years.

36.

Defendants' shutting down, blocking, and/or taking the Plaintiff's
easement of access to the 1-15 Southbound off-ramp at 4500
South and to 4500 South Street was damaging to Plaintiff's
private property interest for a public use without just
compensation.

37.

Plaintiff is entitled to actual, economic, special and compensatory
damages to be proven at trial and believed to be at least
$2,000,000.00.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(DENIAL OF UNIFORM OPERATION OF LAWS UDOT & MURRAY CITY)

38.

Plaintiff re-alleges each of the allegations contained in
paragraphs 1 through 37 of the Complaint as if fully set forth
herein.
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39.

The City and UDOT have discriminated against Plaintiff in
violation of Article I, § 24 of the Utah Constitution, by, among
other things, arbitrarily and capriciously providing other
businesses with direct and beneficial access to 4500 South Street
and by configuring such access so as to direct traffic flow to
those businesses, south of the Affected Property and north and
west of the Affected Property, while at the same time refusing to
offer such accommodations to Plaintiff who paid substantial taxes
to the City and State and who relied on the City and UDOT's
representations.

40.

The City's and UDOT's accommodation of other businesses and
the diversion of traffic through State and Municipal regulations
from the Affected Property towards those other businesses was
unreasonable and was not for a legitimate legislative purpose.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
(BREACH OF THE COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH
AND FAIR DEALING - UDOT & MURRAY CITY)

41.

Plaintiff re-alleges each of the allegations contained in
paragraphs 1 through 40 of the Complaint as if fully set forth
herein.
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42.

Defendant City and UDOT in determining to block and/or take
Plaintiff's substantial property interest in the Affected Property,
denying reasonable access to 1-15, and thereby stifling the
commercial development in the area effectively destroyed or
injured Intermountain's rights to receive its justified
expectations.

43.

Plaintiff Intermountain has been seriously injured as a result of
the City and UDOT's conduct in an amount to be proven at trial
but currently calculated to be in excess of $2,000,000.00.
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(NEGLIGENCE - UDOT & MURRAY CITY)

44.

Plaintiff re-alleges each of the allegations contained in
paragraphs 1 through 43 above as if fully set forth herein.

45.

Plaintiff alleges that in the planning and execution of the traffic
flow surrounding the Affected Property the City and/or UDOT,
their employees, and agents failed to exercise reasonable care
when creating the circuitous route.

46.

Plaintiff further alleges that UDOT, its employees, and agents
failed to exercise reasonable care in the planning, design, and
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execution of the reconstruction of 1-15 and the 4500 South
interchange.
47.

Upon information and belief, the Defendants negligently
interfered with the contractual relationships and potential
relationships Intermountain had with vendors and customers, by
(1) causing vendors to discontinue doing business with
Intermountain, (2) making it impossible for Intermountain to
satisfy customers, and (3) jeopardizing the value of
Intermountain's business.

48.

The Defendants have negligently and proximately, caused
damages to Intermountain. Intermountain is entitled to
damages in an amount to be proven at trial for the Defendants'

interference.
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH ECONOMIC RELATIONS UDOT AND MURRAY CITY)
49.

Plaintiff re-alleges each of the allegations contained in
paragraphs 1 through 48 above as if fully set forth herein.

50.

Upon information and belief, the Defendants intentionally
interfered with the economic relationship Intermountain had with

12

its potential buyers, the buyers choosing to not come by the
property and to not do any further business with Intermountain.
51. .Upon information and belief, the Defendants' interference was
for an improper purpose, which was to have Intermountain's
customers and vendors avoid the property voluntarily and
discontinue or avoid any business relationship with
Intermountain.
52.

Upon information and belief, the Defendants' interference was by
an improper means, as Defendants, contrary to law, requested
that Intermountain and other businesses not bring claims against
them and did not conduct condemnation hearings.

53.

The Defendants' interference was the proximate and immediate
cause of Intermountain's economic injuries. Intermountain is
entitled to damages in an amount to be proven at trial.

SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(BREACH OF CONTRACT - UDOT)
54.

Plaintiff re-alleges each of the allegations contained in
paragraphs 1 through 53 above as if fully set forth herein.

55.

Defendant UDOT made representations to Intermountain that
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the closed access to 1-15 at 4500 South would last one year.
56.

UDOT made representations to Intermountain that it would
address the concerns of the local businesses along 1-15,
including those of Intermountain.

57.

Intermountain relied upon those representations and did not
bring an action during the reconstruction of 1-15.

58.

Such forbearance, based on UDOT's representations and
promises to address the needs of business owners, constituted
consideration for that promise.

59.

Defendant UDOT breached this contract by never addressing the
business' concerns, including those of Intermountain.

60.

UDOT further breached this contract by closing access to 1-15 at
4500 South for a period of nearly four years, and not one year
as represented to Intermountain by Defendant UDOT.

61.

Plaintiff Intermountain has been seriously injured as a result of
the Defendant's conduct in an amount to be proven at trial but
currently calculated to be in excess of $2,000,000.00.
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PRAYER FOR RELIEF
NOW THEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment against the
Defendants as follows:
1.

On its First Cause of Action, Intermountain requests that this
Court award it damages in an amount to be proven at trial but
calculated to be at least $2,000,000.00.

2.

On its Second Cause of Action, Intermountain requests that this
Court award it damages in an amoupt to be proven at trial but
currently calculated to be in excess of $2,000,000.00.

3.

On its Third Cause of Action, Intermountain requests that this
Court award it damages in an amount to be proven at trial but
currently calculated to be in excess of $2,000,000.00.

4.

On its Fourth Cause of Action, Intermountain requests that this
Court award it damages for the City and State's negligent
interference with the contractual relationships Intermountain had
and still has with its vendors as well the lost potential
relationships with future customers and vendors in an amount to
be proven at trial and calculated at $2,000,000.00.
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5.

On its Fifth Cause of Action, Intermountain requests that this
Court award it damages for the Defendants' negligent and
intentional interference with the prospective economic
relationships Plaintiff had and still has with its buyers, in an
amount to be proven at trial and calculated at $2,000,000.00.

6.

On its Sixth Cause of Action, Intermountain requests that this
Court award it damages in an amount to be proven at trial but
currently calculated to be in excess of $2,000,000.00.

7.

For costs and attorney fees as allowed by law.

8.

For such other and further legal and equitable relief as the court
may find just and proper.

DATED and SIGNED this ^

day of May 2 0 0 2 .

ZOLL & TYCKSEN, L.C.

B. Ray Zoll</
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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EXHIBIT A

Closed

Ramps:

145 southbound off-ramp to 4500
South

Alternate

Routes for 4500 South

• Exit at 3300 South and takr Stats SITCZI or Redwood Road
• Exit at 5300 South and talc- *>t*t? Sr—t nr *^~~~i r>~~*

EXHIBIT B

INTERSTAi E 15
Juiv 14, 1997

RECONSTRUCTION

Dear Residezt or 3usmcss Owner.*
Cn or around August 5, i e M 5 Reconstruction Project will begin to affect residents, commuters and
businesses using i e 4;C0 S o u i interchange- Trus action is one of many i a t axike up the largest designbuild 'z:ghw/ project m i e United Sates.
f or you, it means planning your trips to address closure of I-15 Southbound off-ramp at 4500 South and
the 4500 South on-ram? to 1-15 Southbound. R c ^ c j q s j i r e ^ : ^ ^
Access to 4500 S o u i frizz M S Southbound
• Exit at 2300 South and take State Street or Redwood Road
• Exl: at 5300 South and take State Scree: or Redwood Read
Access to Points South rom 4500 South
• Take Sate Street to 53CC South on-ramp to 1-15 Southbound
• Take 4500 S o u i to 1-215
An alternate for all Nbri/South travel is 1-215. This roadway has been expanded to four lanes in each
direction. The additional capacity and easy access to east/west surface streets makes this a good alternate
to include in your trip planning- During 4500 South ramp closures, southbound ramps will remain open at
32QQ S o u i and 53CQ South- Rainps at 4500 S o u i will re-open in approximately 12 months.
Drivers can expect quicker and easier access to and rom 1-15 when reconstruction is complete. Until
construchon is complete, staying informed is your key to getting through i e 1-15 reconstruction w i i as
little impact as pessfole to your schedule and your lifestyle. Call i e informatian line at 3SS-uN70-115.
Access i e Web site at w-vw.M5.com. Find and use traffic reports in i e local media. Consider changing
your travel panerns by combining trips or talking w i i your employer about flex-time scheduling. Think
about ridizg a bike, taking i e bus to work or eliminating some zips altogcier by telecommuting - you'll
be reducing raffle (and ycur stress level!).
Included w i i ±is letter, is a flyer addressing issues specific to i e 450Q S o u i areas. Fiyer information
includes ac announcement for harness and community open house meetings. These meetings are an
opportunity to obtain mere infemnation on planned closures, alternate routes, and project process and
schedule - wz hope you will come.
Thank you :n ld^izze

for ycur active

Cml Pro venzano
/)
Business and Community AfzxJz
Program Manager
Wasatch Constructors

pirzcipizicr..

INTERSTATE 15
ROAD

TO

THEFUTUR
July. I

4500 South Interchange Ramp Closur
The rzzons^czcr* of +5C0 Scudi interchange
means quicker, easier access :c and from 1-15.
Ln addmon to rebuilding bridge footings, the
bndges themselves and expanding the decks,
chis intersection will be rebuilt with an
improved interchange. The new Single Point
L'rban Interchange (5?U0 system will make
traffic flow mere effective and efficient.

SEEING I S BELIEVING
Reconstruction aenvmes will bring with them
barriers blodcng closed ramps, detour signs
and seme increased truck traffic Working
with construction impacts may be difficult ac
first, but driver planning and regular use of
alternate routes will make your uizs easier

CLOSURE SCHEDULE
August 6:

I-I5 ScuAbound off-ramp to 45C0 South.
August 6:
45CQ Sou£i on-namp to [-15 Southbound.
East to w-est travel on 4500 South will remain
open d'J-^g ramp closures Infrequent
CCSUTZS may be necessary during hf.dgt
removal activities - tht community, affected
businesses and scrnzts will be notified. The
northbound on-and c:7-ramps will remain
open during this approximately one-year
closure.

>use

ALTERNATE ROUTES
Aczzss to 4500 Scum from 1-15 Southbound
• Exit at 3300 South and cake State Street or
Redwood Road
• Exit at 53G0 South and take SOLZC

Access co Points South from 45C0 South
• Take Sca:e Scree: to 53CC South on-ramp
• lake 45CG South to 1-215
An alternate for all North/South travel is I215. This roadway has been expanded to feu:
lanes in each direction. The additional
capacity and essy access to east/west surface
streets makes this a *coc alternate to include
in your tnp planning. Dunng 4500 South
ramp closures, southbound-otT ramps will
remaLn open at 3300 South and 5300 South.
OPEN HOUSE MEETINGS
Wisatch Constructors will host a series of
Open House meetings focusing on upcoming *
ram? closures at 3300 and ^500 South. The
meetings will gr-'e ^siderrs and businesses a
chance to
• Learn about planned closures
• View plans for &.c reconstructed
interchange
• Discuss communications plans
•
Review alternate route "options
cz~vr~cd on beck...

I - l j Reconstruction
45C North 2200 West
5a!: Lake Or/, b'T 8*116

i

jm

Information: Where to get it
OPEN HOUSE MEETINGS:
B u s i n e s s Open H o u s e s
Monday, July 23
12:00-1:30 p.m.
Quality Inn
4465 Century Dc (450 W)
Murray
Wednesday. July 30
I2:C0-1:30 p.m.
Quality Inn
4^55 Cencir/ Dr (450 W3
Murray
C o m m u n i t y Open H o u s e s
Tuesday. July 29
6 p m. - 8 p m.
Wccdrow Wiiscn Elementary
2325 Sou* 200 Eisz
South Sale Lake
Thu3day July 31
6 p m. - 8 p m.
Sal: Lake Lutheran School ~
4020 South 900 Ease
Sal: Lake Cicy

"PLAN ON I T " - STAY INFORMED
Until construction is complete, staying
informed is your key co getting through the
M 5 reconstruction with as liccle impact as
possible co your schedule and your Iifestyfe.
Read the newspaper and watch/listen-for traffic
updates on radio and TV' news. Tfcu can access
information sources ac:
Internet: www.M5.com
Tbilfrec: 1-888-INFO-M5
UDOT: 961-6000 (recorded information)
QUESTIONS?
V^asacch Constructors
UDOT I-15 Team
Construction Noise

59^-6-CO
231-8167
322-237S

For UDOT issues noc directly related co the
M 5 Reconstrucdon Project, zeetss UDOTs
VVeo sice ac www.sr.ex.srace.ucus and select che
Head Conditions icon, or call UDOT ac
965-10CQ.
yanpool m g
Individuals can get themselves and others
to work by vanpooling. Passengers share

expenses of maintenance and gas according
to distance traveled and frequency.

EXHIBIT C

Closed Ramps:
• 15C0 South southbound off-amp
' 4500 Scuch nonhbcund on and oZ-nvrlFs
• 33C0 Scuch southbound on-rsmp
Open Ramps:
'M ramps ac53CO South

n nn, Ce25cbcund
-'JJCV
lS?5"?
^
f
^
°
- P
« « s only)
Scuch ncrthcound on and off-ramps
• 3300 Souch southbound otT-ramD

Easf/Wesi Closure;
* 45CO South b e w c n 500 West and 100 Itesc
C4^C0 South f e c u n d co 1-15 souchbeund re.-Tuins oct')
A/ternafe East/West Routes• 39C0 South
• 43CO Souch
Freeway Cetours
• 53CO Souch

EXHIBIT 2
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